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INTRODUCTION 
ater affects a large portion of our daily lives, dictating where 
we live, what we eat, and ultimately what we drink. It should 
come as no surprise, then, that it is important that the quality of the 
water we rely on should be protected. Although Congress’s intent was 
to do just that, what it may have done was open the floodgates to 
jurisdictional overreach and mixed interpretations. The Clean Water 
Act (the Act), a result of significant amendments in 1972 to the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, was intended to be the catalyst that would 
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maintain our waters and ensure that they are clean and protected.1 The 
main goal of the Act is to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”2 However, the Act 
additionally indicates that 
[i]t is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect 
the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, 
and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including 
restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water 
resources, and to consult with the Administrator in the exercise of his 
authority under this chapter.3 
It is my belief that this second provision is the culprit creating 
confusion regarding the jurisdictional reach that Congress intended. It 
is both the Act’s objective and Congress’s policy of recognition and 
rights of States that have left the courts and public perplexed, resulting 
in disagreements as to what waters are constitutionally protected under 
the Act. In an effort to clear the confusion on jurisdiction, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the United States Army 
Corps of Engineers (USACE) issued a new Clean Water Rule (the 
Rule) that would take effect August 28, 2015.4 The Rule’s intent was 
to create “predictability and consistency by clarifying the scope of 
‘waters of the United States’ protected under the Act.”5 However, the 
lack of clarity resulted in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit putting the Rule on a nationwide stay less than two 
months after the effective date.6 Ironically, this came as no surprise 
since prior to the stay thirty-two states filed lawsuits against the EPA 
challenging the Rule’s constitutionality.7 Ultimately, the Trump 
administration sent the EPA back to the drawing board to reconsider 
the Rule,8 and on July, 27, 2017, the EPA and USACE rescinded the 
1 See 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251–1275 (West 2011). 
2 Id. § 1251(a). 
3 Id. § 1251(b). 
4 Clean Water Rule: Definitions of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 124, 
37,054 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328) [hereinafter Clean Water Rule]. 
5 Id.  
6 In re EPA, 803 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2015), vacated; In re U.S Dep’t of Def., 713 F. App’x 
489 (6th Cir. 2018). 
7 Michael Bastasch, Congress Poised to Strike Down EPA’s Massive “Waters of the US” 
Rule, THE DAILY CALLER (Jan. 13, 2016, 11:35 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2016/01/13/ 
congress-poised-to-strike-down-epas-massive-waters-of-the-us-rule. 
8 Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Exec. Order]. 
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2015 Rule.9 To fully understand how the Act and Rule that were 
intended to protect and keep our waters clean became “muddied,” 
taking a hard look at the evolution of the Act and case law interpreting 
the Act is warranted. 
I 
CLOUDING THE WATERS 
Initial efforts to protect and control water pollution can be dated 
back to the passing of the 1948 Water Pollution Control Act.10 
Although ideal in theory, the 1948 Act severely limited the authority 
by federal agencies to actually deter pollution. The premise of 
enforcement was based on the polluter affecting interstate waters and 
the health and safety of those in a state completely different from where 
the pollution was first discharged into the water.11 As if this were not 
enough of a setback, successful enforcement efforts additionally had to 
follow stringent notice requirements, state acquiescence to bringing 
forth enforcement actions, and, finally, the polluter’s financial ability 
to avoid committing the violation.12 It is pretty plain to see that the main 
premise and guise of the 1948 Act left water quality protection in the 
hands of individual states and common law, which was not getting 
much of anything accomplished.13 Congress amended the 1948 Act in 
1956 and then again in 1961, both times aiming to extend federal 
jurisdiction for enforcement, yet both times falling extremely short.14 
With every amendment passed, more roadblocks seemed to appear. 
Whether it was time delays or state authorization requirements, the 
goals set out for the Act were far from reached. In 1965, however, 
Congress made incremental progress when its focus shifted to 
enforcing quality standards for interstate waters.15 The caveat and 
9 Definition of “Waters of the United States” – Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 82 
Fed Reg. 34,899 (July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
10 William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional Prescription 
for Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 
210–11 (1987). 
11 Id. at 211. 
12 Id. at 211–12. 
13 Jason Turner, SWANCC: Effects on Federal Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act 
and the Expanded State Roles in Wetland Protection, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 281, 288 (2004). 
14 Andreen, supra note 10, at 212. 
15 Kayla A. Currie, Clear Waters Ahead? The Clean Water Rule Attempts to Bring 
Clarity to the Scope of the Clean Water Act, 47 CUMB. L. REV. 191, 200 (2016). 
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challenge with the Water Quality Act of 1965 was that wholly intrastate 
water quality was left to individual states unless they requested federal 
intervention.16 
In the late 1960s, the Nation’s waters became of heightened interest. 
On a Sunday morning in June of 1969, an oil slick—resulting from 
years of dumping industrial waste—on the Cuyahoga River in 
Cleveland, Ohio, caught fire.17 The damage to nearby railroad bridges 
caused by the fire was estimated at about one hundred thousand 
dollars.18 Although there had been previous fires, and some more 
serious, it was the 1969 fire that brought about the need for change.19 
Similarly, around this time Lake Erie was found to be the source of an 
abundant amount of dead natural life.20 Due to the heavy pollution of 
the lake, it was pronounced “biologically dead” and became an eyesore 
for those around it.21 It was at this point that Congress took action and 
completely revamped its mechanisms for pollution control, and the 
current Clean Water Act was born. The Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972, better known as the Clean Water 
Act, differed from previous amendments in that it shifted from avoiding 
pollution altogether to attempting to manage the type of pollution that 
entered the Nation’s waters and supported major expansion of federal 
involvement.22 The tactic adopted by the Act was to prohibit “the 
discharge of any pollutant by any person” into navigable waters, unless 
it fell within a certain exception or compliance with another section of 
the Act.23 This allowed the federal government to control which 
pollutants could be deposited into the waters by means of permits and 
specifically carved-out exceptions. Additionally, the term “navigable 
waters” in the Act was the main tool the federal government would use 
to extend its reach and jurisdiction over much of the water of the United 
States.24 
16 Id. 
17 Turner, supra note 13, at 289. 
18 Michael Rotman, Cuyahoga River Fire, CLEVELAND HIST., https://cleveland 
historical.org/items/show/63 (last updated Apr. 27, 2017). 
19 Id. 
20 Turner, supra note 13, at 289. 
21 Id. 
22 See Currie, supra note 15. 
23 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(a) (West 2017). 
24 Currie, supra note 15, at 196–97.  
2019] An Attempt at Clearing the Muddied Waters 165 
of the United States 
Even with the new approach in place, the EPA was extremely slow 
to enforce the provisions of the Act. Between 1977 and 1979, the 
number of enforcement actions that the EPA brought forth dropped by 
more than 51%, and by 1982 enforcement had dropped by 73.1%—an 
all-time low.25 Although there was slight improvement in 1983, much 
due to open criticism by the press and Congress, 26 enforcement once 
again declined in 1984. 27 Enforcement eventually came as a consistent 
practice for the EPA. As of thirteen years ago, it was established that 
discharge from the public had decreased 46% while discharge from 
industrial sites decreased a total of 98%.28 Also, two-thirds of the 
country’s lakes once again were able to sustain recreational activities, 
coming a long way from more than forty years ago when only one-third 
was able to do so.29 With such momentum in place, it seemed that the 
Act was a success; however, the very aspect of the Act that once gave 
the EPA its success was the same one that eventually began to “cloud” 
its enforcement. 
II 
THE SLIPPERY SLOPE 
Although “navigable waters” was clearly defined by the Act as 
“waters of the United States, including territorial seas,” the actual 
definition of “waters of the United States” became a highly debated 
topic and remains so today. The Supreme Court has attempted to clear 
up the confusion through three opinions, all issued between 1985 and 
2004.30 The last and most recently issued opinion left much more 
confusion with the lower courts as a concurring opinion followed the 
plurality with vastly different reasoning as to why the Federal Court of 
Appeals’ judgments were vacated and the cases remanded. 
25 Andreen, supra note 10, at 204.  
26 Id. at 206. 
27 Id. at 207. 
28 William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today – Has the Clean Water Act Been a 
Success?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 591 (2004). 
29 Boer Deng, Trench Warfare: The Feds Want to Define “Waters of the United States” 
Scientifically, SLATE (Sept. 11, 2014, 12:27 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_ 
and_science/science/2014/09/waters_of_the_united_states_epa_s_proposed_update_to_the
_clean_water_act.html. 
30 See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Solid 
Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 
(2001); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
166 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 34, 161 
A. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.31 
The Supreme Court made clear in the first of the trio of cases that 
wetlands adjacent to navigable waters were within the meaning of 
“waters of the United States” and, therefore, subject to federal 
jurisdiction.32 In this case, Riverside Bayview Homes, Incorporated 
(respondent), started placing fill material into an eighty-acre marshy 
land it owned as part of a development it was constructing.33 Because 
the respondent had done so without first seeking a permit from 
USACE, USACE filed suit for an injunction, believing that the land the 
respondent owned and was filling fell within the meaning of waters of 
the United States and, therefore, was within its jurisdiction.34 The 
district court found for USACE, but upon the respondent’s appeal to 
the Sixth Circuit, the court of appeals reversed, holding that USACE’s 
interpretation of “waters of the United States” was overly broad and, if 
allowed, violated the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.35 
Additionally, the court expressed concern over extending wetlands that 
“were not the result of flooding by navigable waters” into the definition 
of “waters of the United States.”36 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to determine if USACE properly categorized the land under 
its jurisdiction.37 
Justice White, who delivered the unanimous opinion, pointed out 
that the plain language of the Act’s regulations extended USACE’s 
jurisdiction to “wetlands adjacent to navigable or interstate waters” and 
that, in turn, “wetlands” is defined as lands that are “inundated or 
saturated by surface or ground water,” thereby refuting the suggestion 
of the court of appeals that the lands required flooding by the 
neighboring water.38 Although the Court conceded to the arduous task 
of drawing a clear line that would separate land from water, it focused 
on the legislative intent of protecting the “aquatic ecosystem” that 
required controlling pollution at the closest point possible to the 
source.39 For the first time ever, the Court interpreted the legislative 
31 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
32 Id. at 134. 
33 Id. at 124. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 125. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 126.  
38 Id. at 129. 
39 Id. at 132–33. 
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intent of Congress as one of purposely defining the waters that would 
be covered under the Act broadly.40 White went on to say that Congress 
used its authority under the Commerce Clause to exercise jurisdiction 
over some waters that prior to the implementation of the Act were 
limited—those that were not traditionally navigable.41 Finally, the 
Court found USACE’s judgment—considering wetlands adjacent to 
navigable waters as waters of the United States—to be reasonable.42 
These specific wetlands were close enough in proximity to play an 
integral role in the aquatic system, and pollution to these lands could 
easily “affect the water quality of the other waters within that aquatic 
system.”43 With such a win for USACE, it came as no surprise that this 
decision would entitle it to push the limits and boundaries of its 
authority further. 
B. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States 
Army Corps of Engineers44 
The Supreme Court changed USACE’s almost unlimited authority 
in 2001. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (petitioner), 
was comprised of multiple Chicago cities and villages that were tasked 
with developing a solid waste site.45 Upon locating a 533-acre parcel 
of land that would suit its needs, the petitioner began the process of 
purchasing and preparing the land.46 The land was once a site for sand 
and gravel mining but had since been abandoned.47 As a result of its 
vacant nature, the old site became scattered with permanent and 
seasonal ponds, all different sizes and depths.48 In an attempt to comply 
with all necessary regulations, the petitioner began to contact the 
respective agencies and file for any permits required to fill the ponds.49 
Although USACE initially determined that the land the Petitioner 
intended to develop did not fall within its jurisdiction, upon 
40 Id. at 133. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 135. 
43 Id. at 134.  
44 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 
U.S. 159 (2001). 
45 Id. at 162–63. 
46 Id. at 163.  
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
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reevaluation USACE later concluded it did have jurisdiction over the 
land pursuant to the Migratory Bird Rule.50 The Migratory Bird Rule 
was developed in 1986 by USACE and indicated that its jurisdiction 
under the Act extended to waters that were intrastate in any of the 
following: 
a. [waters] [w]hich are or would be used as a habitat by birds
protected by Migratory Bird Treaties; or b. [waters] [w]hich are or 
would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state 
lines; or c. [waters] [w]hich are or would be used as habitat for 
endangered species; or d. [waters] [u]sed to irrigate crops sold in 
interstate commerce.51 
Even though the petitioner successfully obtained all permits required 
from local and state agencies, USACE refused to issue a permit on the 
basis that the petitioner’s proposed use of the land was not the “least 
environmentally damaging, most practicable alternative” for waste 
disposal.52 
As a result of USACE’s refusal, the petitioner sued under the 
Administrative Procedure Act noting four points, only two of which 
were of major concern: (1) challenging USACE’s interpretation of its 
jurisdiction under the Act and, alternatively, (2) arguing that Congress 
exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause in granting USACE 
this authority.53 The district court found for USACE on all points, and 
the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit.54 The court of appeals upheld the district court’s decision by 
first addressing the constitutionality of Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause.55 The court reasoned that under the Commerce 
Clause, Congress looks at the cumulative impact of any single activity 
that alone might not invoke a substantial effect on interstate commerce 
but taken as a class would substantially affect interstate commerce.56 
The court noted that each year millions of people travel across state 
borders and spend an enormous amount of money hunting and 
50 Id. at 164. 
51 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps 
of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 
328)). 
52 Id. at 165 (quoting U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Chicago Dist., Dept. of Army Permit 
Evaluation & Decision Document, Lodging of Petitioner, Tab No. 1, p. 87). 
53 Id. at 165–66. 
54 Id. at 165. 
55 Id. at 166. 
56 Id. at 166. 
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observing birds.57 This practice would be greatly affected and possibly 
no longer available if bird habitats were destroyed.58 Once it was 
determined that Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause 
to regulate the habitat of migratory birds, the question of USACE’s 
interpretation as to its jurisdiction under the Act was logical. The court 
held that since the Act encompassed any water that was allowed under 
the Commerce Clause, and since the Migratory Bird Rule was already 
found by the court to be proper under the Commerce Clause, USACE 
had properly exercised its jurisdiction over petitioner’s land under the 
Act.59 The Supreme Court granted certiorari but declined to rule on the 
constitutionality of Congress’s ability under the Commerce Clause to 
grant USACE authority. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the 5–4 opinion that reversed the 
ruling of the court of appeals.60 The Court’s majority referenced its 
holding in Riverside early on and recognized its expansion of USACE’s 
jurisdiction “over wetlands that actually abutted on a navigable 
waterway.”61 It made clear, however, that its ruling did not “express 
any opinion” on USACE’s jurisdiction over isolated wetlands that were 
not adjacent to navigable waters.62 In fact, it was in this opinion that 
the Court first synthesized its holding in Riverside to a single phrase: 
“significant nexus.”63 Rehnquist reasoned that it was the significant 
nexus between the specific wetlands found in Riverside and the 
navigable waters that fostered its conclusion that Congress intended for 
the Act to regulate at least some waters that were not “navigable.”64 
The Court emphasized that although precedent may have given the 
term “navigable” a limited effect, it would not be so inclined to “give 
it no effect” whatsoever.65 The Court believed that Congress’s intent 
under the Act was to cover waters that were, had been, or were 
reasonably capable of being navigable in fact.66 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 162. 
61 Id. at 167. 
62 Id. (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131–32 
(1985). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 172. 
66 Id.  
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The final point that the Court made in this opinion spoke to its desire 
to avoid assuming that Congress intended to disturb the “federal-state 
framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state 
power.” 67 To substantiate this point, the Court reiterated that Congress 
chose to retain a provision in the Act that “recognize[d], preserve[d], 
and protect[ed] the primary responsibilities and rights of States” to use 
their land and water.68 This provision would undoubtedly become 
frustrated if the Court were to allow federal jurisdiction via the Act to 
reach land simply because it met the elements of the Migratory Bird 
Rule.69 Although most following the evolution of the Act saw this as 
the Court reeling in the federal government, they recognized that the 
Court left unanswered questions as to whether wetlands that were not 
adjoining navigable waters yet still maintained a significant nexus to 
the aquatic ecological cycle would be covered under the Act and within 
the jurisdiction of USACE.70 
C. Rapanos v. United States71 
In 2006, the Supreme Court was given the opportunity to provide 
guidance on the questions its previous opinions left unanswered and, 
once again, bring clarity to what exactly was considered waters of the 
United States. The 4–1–4 opinion issued by the Court did quite the 
opposite, however, and created even more confusion as to which test to 
apply when determining federal jurisdictional reach—the plurality or 
the concurring opinion.72 In the late 1980s, John Rapanos (petitioner 
Rapanos) decided to develop three parcels of land he owned near 
Midland, Michigan, into a shopping center.73 Each parcel that petitioner 
Rapanos owned contained a portion of “sometimes-saturated soil 
conditions” or wetlands, which petitioner Rapanos needed to fill as a 
part of the development.74 The closest navigable waters were found 
anywhere from eleven to twenty miles away.75 All three of petitioner 
67 Id. at 173. 
68 Id. at 174 (quoting 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(b) (West 2019)). 
69 Id. 
70 Joshua C. Thomas, Clearing the Muddy Waters? Rapanos and the Post-Rapanos 
Clean Water Act Jurisdictional Guidance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1491, 1498 (2008). 
71 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
72 Thomas, supra note 70, at 1493. 
73 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 763 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
74 Id. at 720 (plurality opinion). 
75 Id. 
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Rapanos’s parcels eventually drained into navigable waters (two of the 
parcels emptied into Lake Huron and the third eventually emptied into 
the Tittabawassee River) either via man-made drains or ditches.76 Even 
though petitioner Rapanos was told that his parcels would more than 
likely contain wetlands that were regulated under the Act, he 
nonetheless proceeded to begin construction work consisting of filling 
in the wetlands without first obtaining a permit from USACE.77 
Consequentially, petitioner Rapanos found himself in years of criminal 
and civil litigation and owing thousands of dollars in fees.78 The district 
court found that petitioner Rapanos’s three parcels were “adjacent to 
other waters of the United States” and ruled in USACE’s favor.79 The 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the lower court’s decision 
based on the findings that “there were hydrological connections 
between all three sites and corresponding adjacent tributaries of 
navigable waters.”80 
Like petitioner Rapanos, in the early 1990s, Keith and June Carabell 
(collectively petitioner Carabell) sought to develop a 19.6-acre parcel 
of land in Michigan into multifamily condos.81 Petitioner Carabell’s 
land contained a significant amount of wetlands and was about one mile 
away from Lake St. Clair, home to about 48% of the fishing activity 
that takes place in the Great Lakes.82 Petitioner Carabell’s parcel was 
bordered on one side by a man-made berm that separates it from a man-
made drainage ditch.83 The man-made drainage ditch eventually 
emptied into Lake St. Clair after traveling through various other 
channels.84 USACE denied petitioner Carabell’s permit based on its 
determination that the parcel “provide[d] water storage functions that, 
if destroyed, could result in an increased risk of erosion and 
degradation of water quality” in surrounding navigable waters.85 
Petitioner Carabell filed suit challenging the denial of the permit and 
76 Id. at 729. 
77 Id. at 763 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
78 Id. at 721 (plurality opinion). 
79 Id. at 729. 
80 Id. at 729–30. 
81 Id. at 764–65 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
82 Id. at 764. 
83 Id. at 730 (plurality opinion). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 765 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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USACE’s jurisdiction over their land.86 The district court ruled in favor 
of USACE, finding that petitioner Carabell’s land was adjacent to 
navigable waters, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the ruling.87 The Supreme Court consolidated the cases and 
granted certiorari to determine whether the specific parcels of land in 
both cases constituted waters of the United States under the Act.88 
The plurality opinion, delivered by Justice Scalia, severely limited 
the waters that would fall within USACE’s jurisdiction under the Act 
by starting the analysis with the most basic principle—the definition of 
“water” in the English dictionary.89 Although he conceded that, based 
on prior opinions, “navigable waters” extended beyond the traditional 
term, Scalia reiterated that the Court was not willing to completely void 
the term of any meaning whatsoever.90 Based on the definition, Scalia 
determined that waters of the United States “include only relatively 
permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water” versus land or areas 
where water runs only on an intermittent basis.91 Regardless of the 
limited or broad effect that the Act gave to the term “navigable waters,” 
the plurality argued that, at the very least, the “ordinary presence” of 
water was a necessity and made clear that the language set out in the 
Act did not “authorize [a] ‘Land is Waters’ approach.” 92 The plurality 
also addressed which wetlands the Court believed properly fell within 
the meaning of waters of the United States under the Act.93 In doing so, 
the determinative factor that Scalia highlighted was whether there was 
a continuous surface connection between the wetland and the adjoining 
waters of the United States such that there was no “clear demarcation 
between ‘waters’ and ‘wetlands’” and not merely a hydrological 
connection.94 Scalia reasoned that this is the “significant nexus”—the 
difficulty of defining a clear boundary between water and land.95 
Because the lower courts did not apply the appropriate standards in 
86 Id. at 730 (plurality opinion). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 732. 
90 Id. at 734. 
91 Id. at 732. 
92 Id. at 734. 
93 Id. at 742. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
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determining USACE’s jurisdiction over the four parcels of land in these 
cases, the Court remanded the cases back to the lower courts.96 
Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality’s judgment to remand, but 
in an opinion he alone authored explained that it was for very different 
reasons.97 Kennedy’s concurring opinion set out a different standard to 
determine if wetlands were considered waters of the United States and 
thereby covered by USACE’s jurisdiction under the Act.98 The 
concurring opinion’s main focus was the meaning and vitality of the 
“significant nexus” between the wetlands and adjacent navigable 
waters, which without would result in a lack of jurisdictional grounds 
under the Act.99 In determining what exactly constituted the proper 
significant nexus, Kennedy looked to the legislative intent of Congress 
when enacting the Act.100 In assessing congressional intent, the 
concurring opinion evaluated factors such as the “chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters” and acknowledged that 
since USACE is charged with enforcing the Act, its interpretation of 
the statute should be given deference so long as the legislative intent 
was not frustrated.101 Kennedy criticized the plurality by asserting that 
its opinion “impose[d]” requirements on the jurisdictional reach of the 
Act that Congress never specifically intended: (1) the presence of 
permanent standing water or flow for a certain amount of time, and (2) 
a continuous connection between the wetlands and the adjoining 
navigable waters.102 Kennedy’s concurrence agreed the case should be 
remanded back to the lower court to reassess using the following 
“significant nexus” standard: 
[[W]etlands possess the requisite nexus . . . if the wetlands, either 
alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, 
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
other covered waters . . . . in contrast, [when] wetlands’ effects on 
water quality are speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the 
zone fairly encompassed by the statutory term “navigable waters.”103 
96 Id. at 757. 
97 Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
98 Id. at 759. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 759–60. 
101 Id. at 759. 
102 Id. at 768–69. 
103 Id. at 780. 
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Since Kennedy’s and Scalia’s opinions vastly differed from one 
another, the hope of having clear guidance on jurisdictional 
determination of waters of the United States fell short. With two 
completely opposite standards set forth by the Court, one seeming to 
limit federal jurisdiction while the other expanded it, even more 
confusion ensued.104 Lower courts did not have a consistent message 
on which standard they were to apply, and based on where the case was 
heard, final rulings could differ from one circuit court to the next.105 
III  
MUDDIED OR TAINTED WATERS? 
After recognizing that the Supreme Court’s prior opinions created 
only more confusion as to which waters were jurisdictional under the 
Act, the EPA and USACE went back to the drawing board; in early 
2014 they issued a proposed Waters of the Unites States Rule (the 
Rule).106 In proposing the Rule, the agencies vehemently insisted that 
the Rule was necessary to create the consistency required to keep the 
Nation’s waters safe and that it did not give the agencies any more 
authority than they already had nor implement additional permitting 
requirements.107 According to the agencies, it simplified the 
jurisdictional determination of waters of the United States and was 
more agriculturally friendly.108 These were not arguments that were 
easily bought, and the uneasiness of both Congress and the states was 
quite apparent.109 It was this uneasy attitude that should have 
foreshadowed the amount of controversy and massive distrust in the 
federal government that the finalized Rule would cause.110 
Prior to their proposal of the Rule, the EPA and USACE asserted 
that they did quite a bit of research and had several meetings with key 
people to get their input on the Rule.111 In fact, the agencies really did 
104 Cameron Secord, Uncertain Waters: The Legal Implications of the “New Waters of 
the United States” Rule on the Energy Sector and a Potential Remedy Within Administrative 
Law, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 963, 973 (2017). 
105 Currie, supra note 15, at 210. 
106 Anna Ready, WOTUS: A Controversial Rule, NACS, Aug. 2015, at 27, http://www. 
nacsmagazine-digital.com/nacsmagazine/august_2015?pg=28#pg28. 
107 Bastasch, supra note 7. 
108 Id. 
109 Deng, supra note 29. 
110 Id. 
111 Currie, supra note 15, at 213. 
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think that the Rule would be well accepted because they felt that not 
only did it make the permitting process and jurisdictional delineation 
easier but it was also backed by extensive scientific research.112 While 
the agencies’ Rule still provided for broad authority to protect the 
Nation’s waters, the agencies frequently pointed out that they retained 
all exclusions previously listed in the Act and, moreover, added 
language that clearly stated certain waters the Act did not include 
(2) The following are not “waters of the United States” . . . . 
(iii) The following ditches: 
(A)  Ditches with ephemeral flows that are not a relocated 
tributary or excavated tributary. 
(B) Ditches with intermittent flow that are not a relocated 
tributary, excavated in a tributary, or drain wetlands. 
(C)  Ditches that do not flow, either directly or through another 
water, into a water identified [as navigable water, interstate 
water, or the territorial seas.]113 
Further expressions from the agencies to gain support and 
acceptance of the Rule were that (1) all the exclusions that the Act 
previously had for farmers and their activities were retained, (2) the 
agencies were not making an attempt to regulate any land use, (3) the 
Rule would change absolutely nothing in regard to private property 
rights, (4) the clarity of the Rule would actually increase federal 
jurisdiction over waters by only 3.2% versus the 60% that was currently 
in a “limbo” status, and (5) the Rule maintained Congress’s intent that 
states retain their power to implement water laws complementary to the 
Act.114 The EPA and USACE maintained that the Rule actually 
narrowed the scope of their jurisdiction. However, for every positive 
aspect of the Rule the agencies attempted to showcase, there were many 
who opposed arguing that there were twice as many drawbacks. 
112 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS – WATERS OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL (2015). 
113 Clean Water Rule: Definitions of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 
37,105 (June 29, 2015). 
114 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, FACTS ABOUT THE WATERS OF THE 
U.S. PROPOSAL FACTSHEET (2015); Meghan Bartels, The Waters of the United States 
(WOTUS) Rule: What It Is and Why It’s Important, AUDUBON, Mar. 1, 2017, http://www. 
audubon.org/news/the-waters-united-states-wotus-rule-what-it-and-why-its-important. 
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During the comment period for the proposal of the Rule, the number 
of comments received well surpassed twenty thousand.115 Supporting 
comments for the proposed Rule often aligned with what the EPA and 
USACE’s main goal was—clarifying jurisdictional power to regulate 
waters and strengthen the Act, which through confusion and ambiguity 
had become less effective as the years went by.116 Other supporting 
comments pointed out that the proposed Rule was simply closing up 
loopholes in the Act, allowing the agencies to fully carry out their 
mission.117 Attempts to strike down the Rule by Congress were largely 
due to the negative effect that most farmers and ranchers would 
experience due to the changes.118 Although these same groups would 
be the ones to call the Rule an attempt at a “power grab,” there were 
some from the farming industry who claimed that the effect the Rule 
would have on them was not only minimal but needed.119 Some called 
these arguments against the Rule irrational and ignorant, as most of the 
waters that opponents argued about were already regulated under the 
Act before the Rule’s proposal.120 There were even farmers who 
acknowledged that their activities contributed to the problem, that the 
Rule would ensure that everyone was respecting the water that would 
eventually flow to their neighbors, and that this was a problem on a 
much bigger scale that rightfully should be handled on a federal 
level.121 
Despite what the EPA and USACE pointed out as benefits of the 
Rule, opponents of the Rule strongly and loudly asserted that what the 
agencies said would not match what the Rule’s final written product 
115 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the 
Clean Water Act, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp= 
25&so=DESC&sb=commentDueDate&po=0&dct=PS&D=EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880 (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2019). 
116 Anonymous Public Comment, Comment to EPA Proposed Rule: Clean Water Act; 
Definitions: Waters of the United States, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 8, 2014), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880-11613. 
117 Anonymous Public Comment, Comment to EPA Proposed Rule: Clean Water Act; 
Definitions: Waters of the United States, REGULATIONS.GOV (Nov. 28, 2014), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0880-16083. 
118 See Natasha Geiling, A Controversial EPA Rule Is Pitting Small Farmers Against 
Big Agribusiness, THINK PROGRESS (Jan. 14, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/a-
controversial-epa-rule-is-pitting-small-farmers-against-big-agribusiness-650061605b8b/. 
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would be.122 Although the Rule would provide clarity, it would do so 
at the expense of millions whose land would now be jurisdictionally 
covered under the Act by law.123 Many aspects of the Rule were pointed 
out as contradictory to the agencies’ stance that the Rule narrowed their 
jurisdiction, that they instead widened it.124 One of those arguments 
was that the Rule expanded its jurisdiction to cover tributaries contrary 
to the Court’s opinion in Rapanos.125 For the first time, the Rule defined 
what a tributary would be and, under that definition, there was no 
requirement that there be a continuous or surface flow of water—both 
necessary requirements to adequately fall within the jurisdiction of 
waters of the United States per Scalia’s plurality opinion.126 However, 
if the land met the elements of the definition of a tributary, 
“characterized by the presence of the physical indicators of a bed and 
banks and an ordinary high water mark,” it would fall into federal 
jurisdiction regardless of the fact that there was not a continuous flow 
of water or had not been for years.127 
Another aspect of the Rule that was argued would expand 
jurisdiction was the agencies’ definitions of “adjacent” and 
“neighboring.”128 According to the Rule, all waters that were adjacent 
to navigable, interstate, territorial seas, and tributaries were also 
considered waters of the United States.129 What the EPA and USACE 
did to ensure that they could regulate as many waters as possible was 
to clearly delineate that “adjacent” did not only mean connected 
laterally to waters of the United States but also described those which 
“neighbored” waters of the United States.130 And to provide further 
clarity, the EPA and USACE defined “neighboring” to be waters that 
were within a certain distance (one hundred feet) of a high water 
mark.131 Just so that there would be no confusion as to which portion 
of the body of water was adjacent to the preestablished waters of the 
United States, thereby giving rise to federal jurisdiction, the definition 
122 Deng, supra note 29. 
123 Secord, supra note 104, at 974. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 974–75. 
126 Id. 
127 Clean Water Rule, supra note 4, at 37,105. 
128 Id. at 37,105. 
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stipulated that if any portion of the area fell within the distance 
requirement then the entire larger body of water was considered 
“neighboring” and thereby an “adjacent” body of water to the waters 
of the United States.132 This resulted in the ability of the EPA and 
USACE to regulate that entire larger body of water under the Act.133 
Although the agencies claimed that the Rule was backed by research of 
scientific reviews, they had been unable to clearly articulate where or 
how they came up with the distance requirements for these 
definitions.134 
Further, more opponents of the Rule focused on another facet that 
was prevalent, the need for states to retain their ability to control and 
regulate their land and water use via state and local laws.135 Since states 
have the ability to implement laws, absent contradictions with federal 
laws, they can and should be allowed to regulate intrastate waters as 
they so please. A perfect example of state-enacted water regulations 
would be the water quality control act in the Texas Water Code (the 
Code).136 Although Texas’s water code mimics the same mechanism 
and objective as the Act, on a much smaller scale, it does have one 
major advantage—the clear and specific definition of “water in the 
state.”137 The broad definition in the Code makes it extremely simple 
for the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, the entity 
responsible for enforcement of the Code, to regulate any water that falls 
outside (either unambiguously or not) the purview of the EPA and 
USACE.138 According to the Code, water in the state includes 
“wetlands, marshes . . . all other bodies of surface water, natural or 
artificial . . . navigable or nonnavigable . . . .”139 Although some see 
Texas as a perfect example of why federal jurisdiction should be 
limited, it should not go unnoted that roughly thirty-three states do not 
have any state-based water laws and rely solely on the Act to protect 
its waters against pollution.140 This may be the precise reason why, 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Charles C. Davis, The Clean Water Rule: What It Is and Why It Needs To Go, 43 J. 
LEGIS. 146, 163 (2016). 
135 Turner, supra note 13, at 304. 
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when Congress passed a resolution regarding the Rule in early 2016, 
Obama issued the ninth veto of his presidential career rejecting 
Congress’s attempt to overturn and kill the Rule.141 
With the overwhelming number of comments received, the EPA and 
USACE’s main concern in issuing the Rule should have been the 
likelihood that the final Rule, as written, would be held unconstitutional 
and that its chances of withstanding such a challenge would be slim. 
Based on the Supreme Court’s prior decisions, the crux of its opinions 
rested on the agencies’ reasonable interpretation of the Act and whether 
it was in line with congressional intent. There is an established 
framework that comes into play when a court reviews the interpretation 
of a statute by the agency that administers it.142 This framework 
presents the court with two questions. The first question is whether the 
statute is ambiguous on the particular topic at issue.143 If the topic is 
ambiguous, then the court’s second question is whether the agency’s 
interpretation is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”144 
There is no question that the plain language of the statute prohibits 
anyone from discharging a pollutant, absent a permit, into “navigable 
waters” which, in turn, is defined as waters of the United States.145 
“Waters of the United States” is not defined anywhere in the statute, 
yet it is the very phrase that is integral to the statute as it would 
delineate the waters that are jurisdictionally covered under the Act. 
Since this confirms the presence of an ambiguity, the EPA and USACE 
should have focused their efforts on ensuring that the final Rule was a 
reasonable interpretation of the Act. To say that these efforts were 
nothing more than a losing battle would be an understatement. 
One of the challenges that the agencies’ Rule would face would be 
the contradiction between how the Rule extended jurisdiction to areas 
141 Gregory Korte, Obama Vetoes Attempt to Kill Clean Water Rule, USA TODAY (Jan. 
19, 2016, 8:48 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/01/19/obama-
vetoes-attempt-kill-clean-water-rule/79033958/. 
142 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 843. 
145 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(a) (“Except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 
1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person 
shall be unlawful.”); 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(12) (West 2019) (“The term ‘discharge of 
pollutant’ and the term ‘discharge of pollutants’ each means (A) any addition of any 
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source. . . ”); § 1362(7) (“The term ‘navigable 
waters’ means the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”). 
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that previous case law had specifically excluded. During the initial 
release of the proposed rule, the agencies included for comment the 
proposed definitions of “neighboring” (added into the existing 
definition of “adjacent”) and “riparian area.”146 “Neighboring” 
included waters that were “within the riparian area or floodplain” of 
certain identified waters, and “riparian area” was defined as an “area 
bordering a water where surface or subsurface hydrology directly 
influence the ecological processes and plant and animal community 
structure in that area.”147 These proposed definitions caused an uproar 
among oppositionists. Comments to these proposed definitions pointed 
out that the “riparian area,” as defined, attempted to assert jurisdiction 
over areas where there may not necessarily be a surface connection to 
navigable waters but where the presence of an ecological relationship 
to the area and the habitat for plants or animals was enough to meet the 
definition.148 This definition was contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
opinion rejecting the very principle in SWANCC.149 Strangely enough, 
the EPA and USACE did not address this contradiction in issuing the 
final Rule. Although the final Rule ultimately eliminated the definition 
of “riparian area,” it did so not to avoid the contradiction but instead to 
avoid “unnecessarily complicat[ing]” the Rule.150 The agencies 
concluded that whatever area was covered under the proposed “riparian 
area” would ultimately be found to be within the 100-year floodplain, 
which was included in the final Rule’s definition of “neighboring.”151 
146 Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 
22,187, 22,263 (April 21, 2014). 
147 Id. at 22,199. 
148 See League of Nebraska Municipalities, Comment Letter on Proposed Definition of 
“Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act (Nov. 3, 2014) (explaining that 
the proposed rule explicitly states that a hydrological connection is not necessary where they 
can show that migration patterns of animals or plants established a connection, contrary to 
the court’s previous rejection of the same attempt with the Migratory Bird Rule); Pacific 
League Foundation, Comment Letter on Proposed Definition of “Waters of the United 
States” Under the Clean Water Act (Nov. 10, 2014) (expressing the agencies’ “gross 
distortion” of the terms used with no legal basis and citing the court’s previous opinion in 
SWANCC that the “Migratory Bird Rule” would infringe on States’ power to regulate land 
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149 Id. 
150 Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,053,37,082 (June 29, 
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Even then, the agencies were able to perform a case-by-case analysis 
of a “significant nexus” connection for waters lying outside the 100-
year floodplain.152 The omission of the “riparian area” definition did 
not cure the agencies’ blatant disregard for the Supreme Court’s 
previous opinion that an interpretation encompassing areas solely 
because they had an ecological connection to an animal or plant’s life 
cycle or habitat was unreasonable and against congressional intent.153 
Another obstacle the Rule would face was the impingement on 
states’ rights to regulate their own land and water use, a matter 
Congress made clear it wanted to avoid in the Act.154 It was noted to 
the agencies that prior Supreme Court opinions specifically declined to 
allow an expansive interpretation of the Act’s jurisdiction if that 
interpretation would infringe on the states’ ability to regulate and 
control local land development.155 This was the very issue that the 
plurality in Rapanos attempted to avoid when Scalia wrote that 
the expansive theory advanced by the [USACE], rather than 
“preserv[ing] the primary rights and responsibilities of the States,” 
would have brought virtually all “plan[ning of] the development and 
use . . . of land and water resources” by the States under federal 
control.156  
The more overreaching the Rule became, the more activities and 
areas would require permitting under the Act. This, too, was an act the 
Court previously regarded as a state and local power. For the Court to 
allow a disruption of the federal and state framework, it would “expect 
a ‘clear and manifest’ statement from Congress.”157 Because Congress 
had not changed the language of the Act since the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Rapanos, it is not hard to see that any attempt by the agencies 
to infringe on states’ rights would likely have been considered an 
impermissible interpretation of the Act. 
One final challenge worth noting is that if the Rule was challenged 
under the void for vagueness doctrine, then it likely would have failed 
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the challenge based on the confusion that resulted as to jurisdictional 
reach. Because the Act’s enforcement allows for criminal penalties of 
up to $50,000 per day of violation and/or imprisonment of up to two 
years, the Act is subject to the doctrine.158 The void for vagueness 
doctrine is founded on the principle that our Constitution requires due 
process and fair notice of criminal conduct that is prohibited with 
“sufficient definiteness” that a person of ordinary intelligence could 
understand.159 The Supreme Court has held that vague laws deprive a 
person of ordinary intelligence the opportunity to freely steer between 
lawful and unlawful actions and that these laws “trap the innocent by 
not providing fair warning.”160 The Rule would be the essential element 
of the Act that would delineate which waters were covered, which 
activities were prohibited, and the areas where potential liability would 
exist.161 
An important component of the void for vagueness doctrine is the 
“person of ordinary intelligence.” The Court did not define or put 
parameters on the audience that laws must give fair notice to; therefore, 
it is safe to assume that the “person of ordinary intelligence” has 
evolved since moving into the twenty-first century.162 In 2017, 26% of 
adult Americans had at least a high school diploma or general education 
degree, while only 21.3% held a bachelor’s degree.163 With these 
statistics in mind, would it be possible that a “person of ordinary 
intelligence” in today’s world would have clear knowledge of the 
waters that fall under the Act’s jurisdiction, the prohibited activity in 
those waters, and the resulting punishments for violations? The fact that 
the EPA and USACE used technical expertise and employed science-
based research to determine what waters would be covered under the 
Act make it seem almost impossible that someone with only a high 
158 33 U.S.C.A § 1319 (c) (West 2012) (penalizing negligent violations by a fine no less 
than $2,500 and not to exceed $25,000 per day and/or up to one year in prison, with penalties 
doubling for repeat offenders; knowingly committing a violation can be punished by a fine 
not to exceed $50,000 per day and/or up to two years in prison, also allowing for double the 
punishment for repeat offenders). 
159 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
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school diploma would go to the Federal Register to look up and fully 
understand the Rule.164 Furthermore, the Rule’s case-specific analysis 
in some instances leaves no question as to the vagueness of what waters 
are considered “waters of the United States.”165 Even a person of 
extraordinary intelligence would be unaware of the prohibited activity 
in one of these areas until the analysis was complete. 
CONCLUSION 
It is easy to see from the history of the Act, legislative intent, and the 
Court’s multiple interpretations of “waters of the United States” how 
we ended up so far from any clear guidance as to how wide the EPA 
and USACE’s jurisdiction extends. After the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued the nationwide stay on the Rule, 
everyone resumed their prior methods of jurisdictional 
determination—the very ambiguous and “case-by-case” practice.166 
With his executive order, President Trump attempted to alleviate the 
controversy when he sent back the Rule for further review.167 Although 
the order makes clear that the EPA and USACE are to consider the goal 
of the Act, the roles of Congress and individual states, and the 
interpretation of “navigable waters” in the Rapanos plurality, many are 
skeptical as to what the EPA and USACE will return with.168 While it 
seems that Trump’s executive order attempts to make things right, there 
is criticism that what the Trump administration is really doing is 
ensuring that there is clear reduction in federal jurisdiction over the 
Nation’s waters.169 President Trump openly opined that the Rule was 
“a horrible, horrible rule” and further went on to acquiesce that in 
164 See Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,055 (June 29, 2015). 
165 Id. at 37,104–05 (indicating that waters determined, on a case-specific basis, to have 
a significant nexus to navigable waters, interstate waters, or territorial seas shall be 
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reality it was an underhanded method for a “massive power grab.”170 
Even though the EPA and USACE rescinded the Rule, “…taking 
significant action to return power to the states and provide regulatory 
certainty to [the] nation’s farmers and businesses,” what the ultimate 
changes are and when they will take effect are still quite ambiguous.171 
Once the rescission of the Rule was officially published,  the comment 
period opened for another round of insight, criticism, and critique. If 
the EPA and USACE decide to go with Scalia’s plurality opinion, then 
it is easy to see what the new rule will likely include: only those areas 
with a continuous flow and surface connection to existing waters of the 
United States under the Act.172 However, if the agencies consider and 
choose to reject Scalia’s “navigable waters” interpretation in Rapanos, 
then the EPA and USACE’s ultimate determination of jurisdictional 
reach remains unknown.173 With so many factors to take into account—
clear delineation of water and land, protection of state power, 
legislative intent, significant nexus, and the Act’s objectives—the EPA 
and USACE’s final revisions to the Rule must be truly substantiated by 
legal parameters, otherwise the Nation’s waters could end up tainted 
far beyond remediation. 
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